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DISPATCH NO. 100A-374

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TO : Chief, NEA

DATE: 21 March 1953

FROM : Chief, []

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational/INTEL

SPECIFIC: [] - Reports on Matters Affecting German Interests
Ref.: 100A-374

1. Attached is [] report of a conversation with Josef Sepp ~~THURMANN~~, submitted on 19 March 1953, which is a follow-up to attachments A and B to 100A-374.
2. In view of the indications submitted in reference, that [] may be unreliable in reporting matters affecting West German interests, we recommend that the attachment and similar [] reports not be disseminated. We shall continue to forward these controversial reports under covering Official Dispatches, until such time as we can more accurately assess their significance.

Attachment

[] Report
dated 19 March 1953

Encl.

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19 March 1953

German military expert Tiefenbacher confirmed, March 16 at "Komsis" what Herr von SCHWIMMITZ heard from German ex-colonel ZOLLING (see last week's report).

Egyptian military circles, not only German military experts, complained about standpoint "Bureau Blanc" regarding reinforcements to military experts staff Egypt.

When Dr. Voss returned to Egypt late last year, after tour Western Germany, Headquarters was very disappointed when hearing Dr. Voss' report. Headquarters officers replied to Dr. Voss, as Tiefenbacher told me, that new Western Germany was twice to blame: 1) because of probable ratifying indemnity-treaty with the Jews, 2) because of lack of understanding for Egyptian army's wishes and necessities.

German experts then had often to hear from Egyptian officers that Dr. Adenauer had not found the right answer to Egyptian sympathies for the Germans.

Further statements Tiefenbacher:

"It is foolish to believe that armed forces will ever undertake hostile actions against occupants in case negotiations will remain without result.

Tiefenbacher, however, does not exclude sabotage activity from prepared "patriots" excited by indignation." German experts, he underlined, had nothing to do with any eventual preparations of furious patriots.

"Until some weeks ago many Egyptian staff officers openly welcomed Egypt's final joining of Western defense pact. Two clear tendencies were visible: Neutrality in peacetime and asking Western help in case of aggression - and joining the West in building up as soon as possible a common defense scheme. The second version is now very seldom to be heard because officers do not want to speak against official proclamations which, as they suppose, correspond to real and final decision. The sympathizers of neutrality no longer find contradiction, but the "Westerners" have surely not diminished in number. They are to be found amongst the officers who had military and technical training in Britain, who are coming from the socially higher classes and who had a longer direct contact with British officers before Mustafa NAHAS completely ruined Anglo-Egyptian relations. Many of these officers have now a rather difficult stand because suspected of too much sympathies with the West. The fact that they come from the better and wealthier families does not improve their position."

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